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Abstract 
This article explores the work of history and philosophy in publications by Willystine Goodsell, 
professor of history and philosophy at Teachers College, Columbia University, and the entangle-
ment of Goodsell’s approach to scholarship with that of her doctoral supervisor John Dewey. The 
article experiments with diffractive reading to examine Dewey’s and Goodsell’s approach to his-
tory, as well as Goodsell’s configuration of women’s historical and contemporary participation in 
education. It looks at Dewey’s comment that women’s ‘philosophising’ would not be the same ‘in 
viewpoint or tenor’ as that composed from the ‘different masculine experience of things’ and inves-
tigates the principles that order liberal and vocational education in Goodsell’s view of a reformed 
education for women. The conclusion asks whether diffractive reading is an enhanced form of inter-
textuality.  
Keywords: history, philosophy, diffraction, gender, dualisms, liberal education, vocational educa-
tion, women’s education, girls’ education 
Introduction 
Willystine Goodsell, professor of history and philosophy at Teachers College, Columbia University 
USA, has been credited with being the most important educational theorist among Teachers College 
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women during the interwar period. After working as a school teacher, Goodsell completed a PhD 
with John Dewey and was appointed assistant professor (1910) and then associate professor (1927) 
at Teachers College, where, like William Heard Kilpatrick, she taught history and philosophy of ed-
ucation. Goodsell saw schooling as a potential site for educating democratic citizens, a stance that 
Kathleen Weiler argues places Goodsell in the social reconstructionist camp amongst Teachers Col-
lege progressive educators.1 Much of Goodsell’s teaching and writing was concerned with women’s 
education and democratic citizenship,2 an area largely missing from the work of male progressive 
educators.3 In The Education of Women: Its Social Background and Its Problems (1923) Goodsell 
critiques the work of G Stanley Hall and Edward Thorndike, who asserted that women were in-
nately emotional and nurturing (and intellectually inferior) because of their biological role as moth-
ers. Goodsell also considers ways in which women should be educated in order to participate as full 
                                                 
1
 Kathleen Weiler, ‘No Women Wanted on the Social Frontier: Gender, Citizenship and Progressive Education’, in 
Challenging Democracy: International Perspectives on Gender, Education and Citizenship, ed. by Madeleine Arnot 
and Jo-Anne Dillabough (London: Routledge, 2000), 122-37. 
2
 Goodsell’s books on women include: Willystine Goodsell, A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Insti-
tution (New York: Macmillan, 1915) which appeared in Paul Monroe’s textbook series alongside Dewey’s Democracy 
and Education; Willystine Goodsell, The Education of Women: Its Social Background and Its Problems (New York: 
Macmillan, 1923) (citations in the article are from the 1924 edition); Willystine Goodsell, Pioneers of Women's Educa-
tion in the United States: Emma Willard, Catherine Beecher, Mary Lyon (Mcgraw-Hill Education Classics (New York, 
London: McGraw-Hill Book Company,Inc., 1924); Willystine Goodsell, Problems of the Family (New York and Lon-
don: The Century Co., 1928); Willystine Goodsell, A History of Marriage and the Family (New York: AMS Press, 
1934). 
3
 Kathleen Weiler, ‘The Historiography of Gender and Progressive Education in the United States’, Paedagogica 
Historica 42, no. 2 (2006): 161-76, here 167. 
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and equal citizens in a democracy.4 Sari Knopp Biklen comments that Goodsell’s books are charac-
terised by a particular style of engagement. Before talking about the main psychological or socio-
logical focus of her study, she traces the historical development of a contemporary situation she de-
fines as a problem5 and she uses history to argue that the social construction of ideas of womanhood 
were not inevitable in society as it was currently organised.6  
This article complements Weiler’s and Bilken’s accounts by focussing on the entanglement of his-
tory and philosophy in Goodsell’s work.  The article is prompted by two comments, the first from 
John Dewey, who wrote in 1919:  
Women have as yet made little contribution to philosophy. But when women who 
are not mere students of other persons’ philosophy set out to write it, we cannot 
conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the 
standpoint of the different masculine experience of things.7 
                                                 
4
 Weiler, ‘No Women Wanted’, 130. 
5
 Weiler notes that little historical work has addressed the involvement of women or conceptions of women’s education 
in the social reconstruction movement. To date, Weiler, ‘No Women Wanted’ is the most searching analysis of Good-
sell’s writings on women and their education but see also Sari Knopp Biklen, ‘Willystine Goodsell’, in Women Educa-
tors in the United States, ed. Maxine Seller (New York: Greenwood, 1994), 227-32; R. Engel, ‘Willystine Goodsell: 
Feminist and Reconstructionist Educator’, Vitae Scholasticae 3, no. 2 (1984): 355-80. 
6
 Goodsell, Education of Women, 347. 
7
 Dewey, ‘Philosophy and Democracy’ (Middle Works 11, 45), quoted in Charleen H Seigfried, Pragmatism and Femi-
nism: Reweaving the Social Fabric  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 29. 
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The second is Terri Wilson’s statement that after completing The Conflict of Naturalism and Hu-
manism, Goodsell turned from philosophy to the study of women and the family.8 These comments 
prompt questions about whether, and if so how, philosophy might have played a part in Goodsell’s 
ongoing historical work as well as questions about the place of history in Dewey’s philosophy.9  
To explore these questions the article experiments with diffractive reading to examine Dewey’s and 
Goodsell’s approach to history, as well as Goodsell’s configuration of women’s historical and con-
temporary participation in education. The first section traces entanglements between Goodsell’s and 
Dewey’s publications and outlines diffractive reading as research strategy. The second section uses 
diffractive reading to discuss Dewey and Goodsell’s approach to history. The third section exam-
ines the work of philosophy in Goodsell’s configuration of women’s historical and contemporary 
participation in education and Dewey’s comment that women’s ‘philosophising’ would not be the 
same ‘in viewpoint or tenor’ as that composed from the ‘different masculine experience of things’ 
and to investigate the principles that order liberal and vocational education in Goodsell’s view of a 
reformed education for women. The conclusion re-assembles threads of diffractive analysis to argue 
that for Dewey history was a tool in philosophy, whereas for Goodsell philosophy was a tool in his-
tory; and that it was the balance between history and philosophy that shifted in Goodsell’s work, 
rather than a turn from philosophy to the study of women and the family. The conclusion also ar-
gues that Goodsell’s work departs from ‘the standpoint of the different masculine experience of 
                                                 
8
 Craig A. Cunningham, David Granger, Jane Fowler Morse, Barbara Stengel, and Terri Wilson, ‘Dewey, Women, and 
Weirdoes: Or, the Potential Rewards for Scholars Who Dialogue across Difference’, Education and Culture 23, no. 2 
(2007): 27-62, here 45. The emphasis is mine. 
9
 For aspects of historical context and for the content of Goodsell’s writings (which fall outside the purpose defined for 
this article) see scholarship cited in footnote 5. 
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things’ in ways that shed light on aspects of Dewey’s work. Finally, it raises the question of 
whether diffractive reading is an enhanced form of intertextuality. 
 
Entangled texts and diffraction 
In the forward to her doctoral thesis The Conflict of Naturalism and Humanism (1910)10 Goodsell 
acknowledges Dewey’s ‘vigorous thought’, which she writes ‘has vivified and reshaped my entire 
philosophy of nature and of man’.11 The introduction to The Education of Women also acknowl-
edges the ‘vivification’ of Dewey’s thought on Goodsell’s educational and social philosophy from 
the standpoint of which, she writes, the ‘many-sided problem of women’s education are viewed’ in 
the text.12 In a footnote to her chapter on values she ‘gladly acknowledges her profound indebted-
ness to America’s leading educational philosopher for many of the vantage points from which this 
subject is viewed’.13 Goodsell’s published acknowledgements to Dewey draw on two meanings of 
‘vivification’ in the Western tradition, where ‘to vivify’ is to endow with life or renewed life, or to 
acquire life and become alive, to animate, quicken, enliven, brighten and sharpen.14  Goodsell drew 
on this understanding of ‘vivification’ in a letter to Dewey in 1929, where she counted herself 
                                                 
10
 Willystine Goodsell, The Conflict of Naturalism and Humanism (New York City: Teachers College, Columbia Uni-
versity, 1910). 
11
 Goodsell, Naturalism and Humanism, iii. 
12
 Goodsell, Education of Women, vi. 
13
 Goodsell, Education of Women, 327. 
14
 Oxford English Dictionary. 
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among ‘so many other of the students whose minds have been quickened by your own’.15 A second 
more philosophical meaning of ‘vivification’ refers to how the disjunction of dualistic concepts 
might be overcome in a way that gives life to both terms.16 This understanding of ‘vivification’ 
equates with Dewey’s Cyclopedia entry entitled ‘Dualism’ which defines dualisms as ‘philosophy 
systems which make a hard and fast antithesis between terms which are related to each other in ex-
perience’.17 
Although Dewey supervised Goodsell’s doctoral thesis, the ‘vivification' to which Goodsell alerts 
did not necessarily flow all one way.  In the absence of Goodsell’s personal papers, whether conver-
sations with Goodsell sharpened Dewey’s thinking remains a matter of conjecture. But Charleen H. 
Siegfried draws on accounts from Dewey’s students to argue that in his classes Dewey often 
thought through whatever was puzzling him at the moment and these reflections would appear in 
his next book.18  In the preface to Democracy and Education Dewey notes his debt to a long line of 
students, whose successive classes spanned more years than he cared to enumerate.19 Dewey also 
shared his thoughts with Elsie Ridley Clapp and asked for her reactions. Clapp writes ‘it was 
[Dewey’s] belief that such sharing helped his own thinking’,20 as Sam Stack argues. Dewey’s 
                                                 
15
 Willystine Goodsell to John Dewey, 20 October 1939, Teachers College, Columbia CJDP 9/14 ALS (06177) With 
thanks to Sam Stack for this reference. 
16
 Oxford English Dictionary. 
17
 John Dewey, ‘Dualism’, in A Cyclopedia of Education: Vol.2, ed. Paul Monroe (New York: Macmillan, 1911), 374. 
18
 Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism, 51-2. 
19
 John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1916), iii. References are from the 2004 Dover Publications edition. 
20
 Unpublished Elsie Ridley Clapp Memoirs, 113, quoted in Sam F. Stack, Elsie Ripley Clapp (1879-1965): Her Life 
and the Community School (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 69. 
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‘hearty acknowledgements’ to Clapp in the preface to Democracy and Education for her ‘many crit-
icisms and suggestions’ and his thanks to ‘Professor Kilpatrick’ and ‘Dr Goodsell’ for ‘criticisms’ 
and for having ‘been kind enough to read the proofsheets’ suggest more than a one-way process. 
Neither Clapp nor Goodsell are listed in the index, however. Nor is Dewey’s colleague George Her-
bert Mead, despite, as Geert Biesta argues, Meadian ideas about the role of gesture in human coop-
eration and interaction playing a central role in Dewey’s account of the process of communication 
in ways distinctively different from what Dewey had written before.21 Biesta also cites the potential 
influence on Dewey’s thinking of other Columbia colleagues including the anthropologists Franz 
Boas and Ruth Benedict and Dewey’s former colleague and co-author James Hayden Tufts, whose  
cooperation in their jointly authored Ethics (1908), argues Biesta, exposed Dewey to questions 
about cooperation and coordination of action and its importance for the emergence of group mores 
and customs.22 
Together with Goodsell’s attribution of ‘vivification’ these speculations gesture towards Julia Kris-
teva’s comment on intertextuality that ’any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; [and] is 
the absorption and transformation of another’.23  From the perspective of intertextuality, reading be-
comes a process of moving between texts, and meaning exists between a text and the other texts to 
which it relates within a network of textual relations, as Graham Allen outlines.24 This article adds a 
                                                 
21
 Gert J.J. Biesta, ‘“Of All Affairs, Communication Is the Most Wonderful”: Education as Communicative Praxis’, in 
John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect: A Critical Engagement with Dewey's Democracy and Education, ed. Da-
vid T. Hansen (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), 23-38, here 27-28. 
22
 Biesta, ‘“Of All Affairs”’, 27-28. 
23
 Julia Kristeva, ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’,  in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi, 34-61 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986), here 37. 
24
 Graham Allen, Intertextuality (London: Routledge, 2000 [2011 edition]), 1. 
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further layer to intertextuality by deploying a diffractive strategy to read Goodsell’s and Dewey’s 
texts through one another with a focus on the possibilities for new ideas to evolve.25 As a strategy, 
diffractive reading builds on the optical metaphor of diffraction from wave phenomena in phys-
ics,where diffraction refers to how waves - whether they be light, water or sound waves - behave 
(and spread out) when they move through passages or encounter an obstruction.26 Waves meeting 
(or meeting an obstruction) either create a more intense wave together, cancel each other out, or re-
sult in anything in between.27 At the point of diffraction, the original wave partly remains within the 
new wave after its transformation into a new one and so on, wave after wave.28  What counts in dif-
fraction are the effects of diffraction and entanglement; not the separate elements.29 As Donna Har-
away writes, diffraction is a ‘mapping of interference, not … replication, reflection, or reproduc-
tion’.30 What counts for a diffractive reading are ‘the effects of difference - what Karen Barad refers 
                                                 
25
 Vivienne Bozalek, ‘Socially Just Pedagogies’, in Posthuman Glossary, ed. Rosi Braidotti &Maria Hlavajova (Lon-
don: Bloomsbury, 2018), 396-98, here 398. 
26
 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 90-1. 
27
 Maria Uden, The Novel Feminist Diffraction Concept Its Application in Fifty-One Peer Reviewed Papers. Research 
Report (Lulea Tekniska Universitet, 2018), 2. 
28
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 97-123 
29
 Lynne Keevers and Lesley Treleaven, ‘Organizing Practices of Reflection: A Practice-Based Study’, Management 
Learning 42, no. 5 (2011): 505-20, here 509. 
30
. Donna Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others’, in L.C. Gross-
berg, C. Nelson, C and P.A. Treichler (Eds.) Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge), 295–337, here 300. 
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to as the ‘differences that matter’ that result from ‘interferences’ between texts’31 through which po-
tentialities for new understandings emerge. But, as Iris van der Tuin argues, diffractive reading can 
also be productive in affirming links between scholars.32 
The following section examines how history is configured in Dewey’s and Goodsell’s work. It 
reads Goodsell and Dewey through one another to look first at their configuration of history as a 
scientific approach and as a history of the present; and second, as a critical and pedagogic tool. 
Genetic history as scientific enquiry 
Diffractive reading seeks generative ‘inventive provocations.33 As Goodsell's and Dewey’s ap-
proach to historical practice illustrates, these ‘inventive provocations’ can strengthen dynamic links 
between scholars.34 Goodsell’s use of history to trace a situation she defines as a problem aligns 
with Dewey’s comments in Democracy and Education that the ‘vitality’ of history comes from its 
links with the present, and with his view that ‘knowledge of the past is the key to understanding the 
                                                 
31
 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter’, Signs 28, 
no. 3 (2003): 801-33, here 811. 
32
 Iris van der Tuin, Generational Feminism: New Materialist Introduction to a Generative Approach (Boulder: Lex-
ington Books, 2014). 
33
 Karen Barad interview in Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: interviews & Cartographies (Lon-
don: Open Humanities Press, 2012), 50. 
34
 Iris van der Tuin, Generational Feminism: New Materialist Introduction to a Generative Approach (Boulder: Lex-
ington Books, 2014), 97. 
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present’. History, writes Dewey ‘deals with the past, but this past is the history of the present’.35 He 
maintains that the principle of gaining insight into any complex product is to trace the process of its 
making - to follow it through the successive stages of its growth, which for Dewey makes ‘the true 
staring point of history … always some present situation with its problems’ because ‘past events 
cannot be separated from the living present and retain meaning’.36 
 
Dewey fleshes out his approach to history In two linked articles in the Philosophical Review (1902) 
where he terms his approach to history as ‘genetic’.37 He draws on a model of history from Thor-
stein Veblen who argues for ‘a genetic account’ as an evolutionary science. Working in the arena of 
economics, Veblen casts his genetic approach as a ‘process of an unfolding sequence’ in which to 
seek the ‘cumulative sequence [of economic] institutions)’.38 Veblen works with a model of ‘man’ 
[sic] whom he characterises not as a ‘bundle of desires that are to be saturated by being placed in 
the path of the fires of the environment’, but as a ‘coherent structure of propensities and habits 
                                                 
35
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 205. Dewey’s Democracy and Education and Goodsell’s The Conflict of Natu-
ralism and Humanism share similar discussion from the history of intellectual thought, as well as headings like ‘Educa-
tion as National and Social’, which appears as a chapter heading in The Conflict of Naturalism and Humanism and as a 
section heading in Democracy and Education. 
36
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 206. 
37
 John Dewey, ‘The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: 1. Its Scientific Necessity’, The Philosophical Re-
view 11, no. 2 (1902): 107-24; John Dewey, ‘The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: II. Its Significance for 
Conduct’, The Philosophical Review 11, no. 4 (1902): 353-71. 
38
 Thorstein Veblen, ‘Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 12, July 
(1898): 378-93. The discussion of Veblen draws on Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 328. 
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which seeks realisation and expression in an unfolding activity’.39 For Veblen, the agent’s ‘methods 
of life to-day’ are ‘enforced upon him by the habits of life, carried over from yesterday’ and by ‘cir-
cumstances left as the mechanical residue of the life of yesterday’. These ‘residues’ become the 
point of departure from which genetic (evolutionary) history traces ‘the cumulative working out of 
the economic interest in the cultural sequence’.40 
Dewey’s approach to history is consistent with his approach to continuities of dualisms more gener-
ally. He argues that genetic history is a scientific approach that overcomes dualisms of intuitionism 
and empiricism because it embodies the principle of continuity of process that does not separate 
past and present.41 For Goodsell genetic history is scientific because it seeks ‘ideals which are sug-
gested by actual conditions, not formed in the study by speculation’.42 For Dewey genetic history is 
scientific because it enables the scholar to determine ‘the exact conditions, and the only conditions, 
which are involved in [a phenomenon] coming into being’, which he argues means there is a direct 
parallel between genetic history and scientific experiment. In genetic history it is the presentation of 
the matter in a simplified form that enables the researcher to ‘detach and grasp separately elements 
which are wholly lost in the complexity of the mature phases’.43 Dewey sees this presentation as 
analogous to the artificial isolation of a physical fact from its usual context in the experimental 
method of the physical sciences. This isolation enables the significance of the later ‘members’ of 
                                                 
39
 Veblen, ‘Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, 391. 
40
Veblen, ‘Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?’, 394. 
41
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 11’, 371. 
42
 Goodsell, History of the Family, 4. 
43
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 123. 
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the series to be established, and each successive degree of complication to be traced ‘as it intro-
duces itself’.44 
Having found conditions operating historically by themselves, we can see what 
happens when these conditions come together. We can refer the more complicated 
fact to the combination of conditions. Here we have the counterpart of the syn-
thetic recombination, or cumulative method of experiment. We put together the 
separate threads coming from different sources, and see how they are woven into 
a pattern so extensive and minute as to defy the analysis of direct inspection.45 
The ‘fact’ is not to be viewed in isolation but is given meaning as a ‘distinct and yet related part of a 
larger historic continuum’ which enables an interpretation of the process operating under different 
conditions.46 For Dewey, this makes genetic history ‘an organ for analysis of the warp and woof of 
the present social fabric of making known the forces which have woven the pattern’.47 But what is 
important, writes Dewey, is not the identity of the content, but the method of comparison and ab-
straction, which he argues must point to differences; for only through insight into diversification, he 
argues, can the hold upon the process become ‘vital and concrete’.48 
For Dewey, the analogy of control from the physical sciences means that genetic history has the po-
tential to lead to intellectual control because of the ability to interpret phenomena. He also locates 
genetic history as a tool for practical control because of ‘the ability to secure desirable and avoid 
                                                 
44 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 117. 
45
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 117. 
46
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 123-4. 
47
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 208. 
48
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 119. 
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undesirable future experiences’.49 Dewey argues that because the genetic method helps us see the 
present situation comprehensively and analytically, and to grasp factors that have counted in differ-
ent ways, it enables us to direct conduct itself. From Dewey’s perspective, this makes genetic his-
tory amenable to questions of ethics and morals. For Goodsell it makes genetic history an element 
in the toolbox to ameliorate the political situation of women. The following section deploys diffrac-
tive reading to explore some of the threads through which the effects of this difference in Goodsell’s 
and Dewey’s deployment of history are set to work. 
Genetic history as pedagogical and ameliorative tool 
Dewey argues that genetic history provides the intellectual tools to bring morality into the realm of 
science50 through enquiry into processes through which moral practices and ideas have originated.51 
We cannot, for example, says Dewey take a present case of parental care, or of a child's untruthful-
ness, and cut it into sections, or tear it into physical pieces, or subject it to chemical analysis. Only 
through history, through a consideration of how it came to be what it is, can we unravel it and trace 
the interweaving of its constituent parts.52 He sees genetic history as a method for determining how 
specific moral values came to be, and as a way of determining their significance as indicated in 
their ‘career’.53 His genetic history of ‘moral facts’ operates on the assumption that norms, ideals 
                                                 
49
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 123-4. 
50
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 11’, 355. 
51
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 113. 
52
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 1’, 113. 
53
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 11’, 356 
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and unreflective customs arise in response to the demands of particular situations and once in exist-
ence operate with a lesser or greater success.54 He argues that genetic history is an instrument of in-
quiry, of interpretation, and of criticism of current assumptions and aspirations because the ‘pasts’ 
of currently accepted customs, beliefs, moral ideals, hopes, and aspirations become available for 
analysis.55 For Dewey moral judgments are judgments about ways to act, about deeds to do, about 
habits to form, and about ends to cultivate. From Dewey’s viewpoint genetic history ‘directs’ con-
duct because it modifies a judgment, or a conviction, which leads to modified conduct.56  Pursued in 
this fashion, argues Dewey, history is of ethical value in teaching. 
In Ethics (1908), Dewey and Tufts adopt a problem-based approach to analysis in which they locate 
genetic history as a pedagogical device to assist students view the field of morality ‘objectively’ and 
to see problems as ‘real problems’. They argue that considering how moral values were formed in 
the first instance 57 and tracing moral life ‘through typical epochs of its development’, enables stu-
dents to realise what is involved in their own habitual standpoints.58 Dewey and Tufts argue that as 
students move from simpler material59 and trace ‘rudiments’ and ‘survivals’, some of which apply 
to the present and some of which do not, genetic history’s comparative element sharpens ‘vision’ 
                                                 
54
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 11’, 356 
55
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 11’, 370. 
56
 Dewey, ‘Evolutionary Method: 11’, 370. 
57
 John Dewey and James H, Tufts, Ethics, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1908 [1909 edition on kindle]), loc. 17826. 
While the overall text of Ethics was approved by Dewey, the section on the family is not discussed in this article be-
cause it was written by Tufts. 
58
 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, Preface. 
59
 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, loc.17829. 
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and awakens students’ ‘attention’ when considering theoretical matters,60  From this perspective, 
genetic history constitutes a style of reason61 and technology of the self62 in which the self is written 
through the increasing self-regulation of the learner as moral subject, able to intervene in moral and 
social affairs63 through a form of historical consciousness around the idea that learning about the 
lineage that led to the present is needed to build both society and its citizens.64  
In The Family as a Social and Educational Institution Goodsell situates genetic history as ‘most 
likely to be efficient in bringing about a better state of affairs in any problematic situation’65 be-
cause it gives ‘respect for facts’, rather than for ‘theories about facts’ and so provides ‘broad and 
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accurate knowledge’ as the first step in social reform.66 An enlightened understanding of how cer-
tain laws, customs and ideas came to be and why they are still maintained, she writes, is the first 
step toward working out a satisfactory theory of how things ought to be.67 
As the following section explores, Goodsell deploys genetic history in her arguments for reform of 
women’s education. The first part of the next section reads Goodsell’s The Education of Women, A 
History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution, and Dewey’s Democracy and Educa-
tion through each other. This diffractive reading is not undertaken to compare and contrast whether 
the ‘vivification’ of Goodsell’s work results in degrees of ‘fidelity’ with concepts as used by Dewey 
which would be to ‘empty’ history by seeing Dewey’s writing as a fixed idea and texts as enclosed 
objects.68 Rather, reading diffractively seeks the results of combining the disturbances created by 
reading the texts through each other, which Barad terms ‘superpositions’. In Barad’s deployment of 
diffraction as metaphor this is analogous to how a new wave emerges when individual waves in the 
sea flow together having met an obstruction or flow against a breaker.69 The two ‘breakers’ around 
which the diffractive reading focuses in the next section are aspects that Goodsell constitutes as 
‘problems’ and which thread through her use of history and her arguments to reconfigure women’s 
education: first, social isolation; and second, individualism. Here I am interested in how philosophi-
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cal concepts might thread into Goodsell’s historical analysis. I also use diffractive reading to con-
sider whether, despite Goodsell’s acknowledgement of the ‘vivification’ of Dewey’s work, differ-
ences emerge between Goodsell's and Dewey’s writings that might align with Dewey’s comment 
that women’s ‘philosophising’ would not be the same ‘in viewpoint or tenor’ as that composed from 
the standpoint of ‘the different masculine experience of things’. 
Genetic history and social participation 
In the The Family as a Social and Educational Institution and The Education of Women Goodsell 
uses genetic history to emphasise that ideas of womanhood are historical and social constructs,70 
and to deny the inevitability of society ‘as it is presently organised’.71 These ideas form key ele-
ments in her critique of Hall and Thorndike’s views of women as innately emotional and nurturing 
and intellectually inferior because of their biological role as mothers.72 In The Education of Women 
Goodsell points to the historic cramping of life and its effects that result from women’s social isola-
tion in the family with the result that ‘she failed to develop in any marked degree those social quali-
ties so highly esteemed by civilised men’.73 
In The Family as a Social and Educational Institution Goodsell deploys a genetic analysis allied 
with an orientalist orientation characteristic of the feminist discourse of her day to rehearse a similar 
thread of social isolation in a narrowly personal environment. She characterises the ‘patriarchal 
family of the Greek type’ through ‘problematic’ marriage-relations that exclude reciprocity between 
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husband and wife but includes sexual impropriety. She sees arranged marriages leading to igno-
rance of each others’ temperaments and characters, which she argues provides a serious handicap to 
marriage relations. She maintains this is exacerbated by what she terms the docility of the typical 
girl-bride in contrast to the cultivation of the husband, a situation Goodsell considers is rendered 
more difficult by the seclusion of the bride in early life ‘remote from all developing influences’ 
save that of her own family and friends. Due to the effect of confining the Greek woman largely to 
the home, the husband’s range of interests and activities increases as he engages with public ques-
tions in the market-place or the state gymnasium, with the result that the life of the man and wife 
‘flow on widely separate channels’ As a result, a marriage ‘begun in indifference’ not infrequently 
ends in ‘cold estrangement if not in positive aversion’ because ‘the wife’s mental power is limited 
wholly by personal and household concerns’.74 She portrays Ionian married women lapsing into 
adultery with slaves as ‘evidence of the truth … that purity in its purest sense cannot be secured by 
ignorance and seclusion’.75 She points to a contrast with prostitutes living in houses licensed by the 
state and to the existence in Greek cities of Heteriae - women of foreign birth and trained from 
childhood to a life of immorality, but who have been well educated, well informed on public affairs 
and socially gifted, but are accessible only to wealthy or socially-prominent men. She critiques a 
Greek view of marriage for neglecting the education of respectable women who proved ‘dull and 
naive in the company of cultivated husbands’, while granting ‘dissolute’ women intellectual train-
ing.76 
What emerges when this genetic account of the ‘problematic’ ‘patriarchal family of the Greek type’ 
is read through Democracy and Education is an underlying dualism of communication-isolation 
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that both Goodsell and Dewey work to redress. Like Dewey Goodsell locates the family as a social 
institution in organic relation to other social institutions in promoting the best interests of commu-
nity life.77 She also portrays democracy as a mode of associated living78 based on inclusive ways of 
social and political action, at the heart of which is the process of communication that Biesta terms 
conjoint activity,79 which hinges around the principle of shared interests and opportunities for com-
munication and participation. This constitutes the primary test of the worth of any form of human 
association, a position that Dewey outlines in chapter 7 of Democracy and Education.80 Sharing this 
philosophical stance, Goodsell depicts an ‘undesirable society’ in which ‘internal and external barri-
ers to free intercourse and communication of experience’ operate and are inimical to women’s ‘de-
velopment’.81 Her historical account is underpinned by a philosophical stance concerned with dual-
isms of communication-isolation that in her account also map onto dualisms of public-private. 
In Democracy and Education Dewey, too, acknowledges serious barriers between men and women 
and includes gender relations in his criticism of the hard and fast walls which mark off social 
groups and classes.82 These prevent fluent and free communication by setting up different types of 
life experience, each with isolated subject matter, aim and standard of values. He, too, rejects the 
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then-debated misconception of the inherent mental inferiority of the female sex,83 But, argues 
Weiler, in Democracy and Education, Dewey takes the classic liberal feminist line of women being 
employed like slaves (and like artisans) to furnish ‘the means of substance in order that others, 
those adequately equipped with intelligence, may live the life of leisurely concern with things in-
trinsically worthwhile’.84 Dewey also omits from his account of gender any view of the husband in 
reciprocal relation to the woman, which Susan Laird argues leaves unexamined questions about 
possible female subordination and servitude within the family.85 In Goodsell’s account of Greek 
women’s isolation, female subordination and servitude within the family run as threads through her 
analysis and reappear in in her discussion of the individualism of the American family, to which 
discussion now turns. 
In The Family as a Social and Educational Institution Goodsell’s analysis of the modern American 
family forms part of what she views as a larger problematic around the family’s ‘instability and 
maladjustment to social conditions’.86 Goodsell sees the modern American family composed of ‘in-
dividuals with approximately equal rights before the law, and with a disposition to assert those 
rights in ways likely to weaken the unity of family life’.87 She seeks the ‘origins’ of the American 
family’s individualism through a genetic history of the Roman family, which she depicts in the 
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‘simple days’ as ‘unified’, with no place for the individual outside the family institution - ‘to be a 
free-lance, not owing obedience to a family head, was to be a social outcast’.88  Goodsell portrays 
the Roman wife and mother in these ‘simple days’ as both honoured and subordinated, respected 
but without legal rights either to property or as a person: she ‘merely pass[ed] from the power of the 
father to that of her husband’.89 But within these restrictions, argues Goodsell, the Roman matron 
was mistress of the household, and respected as the guardian of the family honour, her husband’s 
partner in the education of the children, and priestess beside her husband in family worship, able to 
walk in public with considerable freedom, when men were expected to make way as a mark of their 
respect. It was custom, argues Goodsell, not the command of her husband that restricted a Roman 
woman’s movements.  Goodsell notes that in what she terms the ‘unified’ Roman family girls re-
ceived a careful home training in their future duties as Roman housewives, and some middle class 
[sic] girls attended lidi (private elementary schools)’. She concludes that girls were probably not left 
in complete ignorance (unlike Greek maidens) but were given some instruction in reading and writ-
ing at home.90 
In her genetic exercise Goodsell traces a growing individualism of the Roman family as customs 
changed with the change of ideas resulting in the Roman family coming to resemble the American 
family in a number of ways. Goodsell connects changes in the status of women to the Romans’ 30 
year war, when management of estates devolved to wives, and some Roman women became 
wealthy from accumulated wealth that flowed into Rome both as a result of war, and from the de-
creasing population of men from death, enslavement, or absence on duty. For Goodsell, the passage 
of authority in the management of family estates from absent husbands to their wives provided a 
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training in self-reliance and efficiency that led to a rise in the social status of women. While this 
power was delegated (and withdrawn on the return of the family head), it was a source of personal 
self-worth that fostered women’s desire for broader opportunity and influence and stimulated their 
development of ‘vigorous personalities’.91  This was coupled with an unwillingness to submit to re-
strictions on their daily lives and interests when husbands returned from war, which she portrays as 
having wide-ranging effects on family relations, as some Roman women sought to become learned, 
and some became a power in politics. She concludes that changes in the law resulting from changed 
conditions meant that the Roman matron was to all intents and purposes a free agent controlling her 
own actions and to some extent her property, while a changed conception of marriage made the 
wife the equal of her husband and recognised her right to the full and free development of her pow-
ers as an individual with responsibilities and privileges.92  
Differences emerge through diffractive reading between elements of analysis related to women that 
Goodsell deploys in her genetic history of the individualism of the American family and elements 
of analysis that Dewey deploys when locating women with slaves. The shifting exercise (and dimi-
nution) of male power as well as the shifting relative status of the woman under different systems 
and in different historical periods emerge in Goodsell’s text but not in Dewey’s. In Goodsell’s text 
(but not in Dewey’s) women also traverse boundaries of public and private in their exercise of 
power and authority as circumstances change. In her historical account Goodsell demonstrates con-
tinuities of experience across dualisms of public and private as they relate in experience to women 
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and men. But questions about female power and practices that demonstrate continuities across pub-
lic-private dualisms are eclipsed in Dewey’s account of women as slaves, despite continuities form-
ing a key principle in Dewey’s philosophical approach to dualisms.93 
What ‘comes to matter’ in Dewey’s account is that his position on dualisms of gender resonates 
more generally with an apolitical stance that Biesta identifies in Dewey’s work. Like Hanson, 
Biesta highlights the stress on the moral in Dewey’s final paragraph in Democracy and Education, 
which Biesta relates to Dewey’s espousal of the notion of Bildung - the process of self-formation 
through the dialectical interaction of the individual with culture and society,94 which Biesta argues 
orients Dewey towards an account that is moral and social. Goodsell, too, sees the ‘socialised and  
moralised character’ as the ‘supreme end of education’95 and she tackles ways in which women 
should be educated in order to participate as full and equal citizens in a democracy.96 But her politi-
cal desire to provide a prescription to reform women’s education orients her towards a notion of Er-
ziehung - a stance towards education, that as Biesta notes, is focussed on actions by an educator to 
promote particular ‘qualities’ in those being educated, with the ultimate aim of promoting their free-
dom and independence.97  
                                                 
93
 See also Laird, ‘Women and Gender’ and Charleen H. Seigfried, ed. Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey (Penn-
sylvania State University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). 
94
 Gert  J.J.Biesta, ‘Education and Democracy Revisited: Dewey's Democratic Deficit’, In John Dewey's Democracy 
and Education: A British Tribute, ed. Steve Higgins and Frank Coalfield (London: UCL IOE Press, 2016), 149-69, here 
153. 
95
 Biesta, ‘Dewey’s Democratic Deficit’, 177. 
96
 Weiler, ‘No Women Wanted’, 131. 
97
 Biesta, ‘Dewey’s Democratic Deficit’, 166 
   
 24 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in HISTORY 
OF EDUCATION on 24 July 2019, available 
online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0046760X.2019.1628311.  
Because diffraction patterns record (as Haraway puts it) ’the history of interaction, interference, re-
inforcement [and] difference’,98 diffractive reading enables researchers to account for both ‘the his-
tory of how something came to be as well as what it is simultaneously’.99 There are resonances be-
tween diffractive analysis and Foucault’s genealogical approach in that diffractive reading enables 
glimpses of processes through which truths and knowledge are produced, as well as the truths and 
knowledge produced,100 as analysis of Goodsell's and Dewey’s texts illustrate.101  
In the final section, I comment on the particular ‘qualities’ associated with Goodsell’s prescription 
of liberal and vocational education for women. I use diffractive reading to explore continuities of 
experience in the grid that gives intelligibility to the principles that order liberal and vocational edu-
cation in Goodsell’s views on women’s education which draw on her ongoing engagement with du-
alisms of isolation-communication and her analysis of individualism. 
Genetic history and women’s education 
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Like Dewey Goodsell articulates a focus on the moral person almost at the end of The Education of 
Women. In her sights are ‘problems’ of the ‘new girl’, the ‘flapper’102 and the woman educated in 
the liberal arts college, whom she portrays as ‘isolated’ in ways that resonate with her genetic anal-
ysis of communication- isolation dualisms and of individualism in The Family as a Social and Edu-
cational Institution. Goodsell identifies the withdrawal of highly educated women from ‘intimate 
contacts with social life in the interest of a purely personal development’ as problematic.103 For 
Goodsell the appeal of the faculty of colleges and universities is to the intellect not to the ‘social 
impulses’ or to the ‘power to do’.104 This, Goodsell argues, deprives young women of opportunities 
to work with an organised group for an end which serves the public good or to come into ‘sympa-
thetic and helpful contact’ with many types of human beings. For Goodsell, this runs the risk that 
women’s growth in social understanding and sympathy will be permanently hampered as they with-
draw into a social isolation from a ‘mistaken sense of complete independence which may result in 
the arrest of growth’ and a ‘crystallisation of life’.105 Goodsell warns that such isolation risks both a 
‘retardation of personal development’ and an irreparable loss to society’.106 
Goodsell’s discussion of what she describes as an almost complete exclusion from liberal arts col-
leges for women of courses having a vocational bearing resonates with Dewey’s views in Democ-
racy and the Education on liberal and vocational education and on the individual and the world.107 
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As in Dewey’s account of the formation of the moral person, Goodsell sees democracy as a mode of 
associated living and the school as an instrument for bringing about democracy by providing oppor-
tunities for pupils to participate in the construction, maintenance and transformation of social and 
political life more generally. Goodsell, too, stresses the importance of an education linked to active 
experience and everyday life. In The Conflict of Humanism and Naturalism she had argued that 
only when educational institutions reproduce life-conditions which challenge thought by presenting 
it with novel and problematic situations can ‘knowledge capable of functioning in the guidance life 
… be acquired and applied’.108 Such views inform her argument in The Education of Women that 
educational institutions for women have to realise that ‘free personality cannot attain fruition in an 
academic atmosphere aloof from the concerns of every day social life’. 
For Goodsell, the academic aloofness from the concerns of every day life with which she charges 
women’s liberal arts colleges reinforces a historic conception of culture ‘as a priceless personal pos-
session, having nothing to do with the work-a- day world’.109 As such it constitutes a response to 
the ‘crisis in culture’ to which Biesta and Burbules argue Dewey’s work also responds.110  In The 
Crisis of Naturalism and Humanism Goodsell traces this crisis genetically to a bifurcation of 
thought in the philosophy of nature and of man around naturalism and humanism.111  Here, she ar-
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gues that bifurcation leads to a failure by the humanist to see that ‘ideals are vital when born of pre-
sent needs of ministering to them’ and causes the naturalist to be blind to ‘the truth that the very 
facts to which he binds his faith are dependent for their discovery upon those ideals he ignores’.112 
In The Crisis of Naturalism and Humanism, she sees the task of educational history as abolishing 
this opposition by harmonising the discordant elements in the present-day curriculum. For Good-
sell, his requires a higher degree of unity in the aim and method of education113 around the ‘pre-
cious product of the interaction of thought and things’.114  Like Dewey in The School and Society115 
and The Child and the Curriculum116 Goodsell argues that subjects have become detached from liv-
ing experience117 and severed from their source in social life with the result that they provide an in-
dividualist type of education118 in which instruction deals too much with ‘spectral abstractions’ and 
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too little with warm realities’, so that students do not perceive that ‘second hand knowledge, so log-
ically presented, once had its birth in experience and leads back to it’.119 Knowledge, she states, 
cannot be digested vicariously for any individual. If it is to become part of the ‘bone and sinew of 
… intellectual and moral life it must catch hold of that life - it must show its credentials’;120 for to 
educate, argues Goodsell, is to ‘make plain the bearing of all knowledge upon human life, in its 
physical, social or moral aspects’.121 
These ideas from The Crisis of Naturalism and Humanism re-appear in The Education of Women in 
Goodsell’s argument that studies have been fenced off from each other so that they serve different 
ends and embrace difference values, which she relates to prevalent views of what the ‘liberally edu-
cated man or woman should achieve’.122 Like Dewey in Democracy and Education Goodsell es-
chews a hierarchy of subjects. She argues that the value of a study cannot be determined by the na-
ture of the subject matter with which it deals. Rather (and like Dewey), its value lies in the range 
and depth of ‘appreciations’ that it makes possible.123 Her prescription for women’s education aims 
to break down barriers between subjects as well as between subjects and daily life by providing stu-
dents with ‘live experiences’ through opportunities for bodily activity in projects they themselves 
frame.124 Such ‘vital experiences’, argues Goodsell (acknowledging Dewey’s Democracy and Edu-
cation), would mean intellectual, emotional, and personal values would be personally felt, along 
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with the joy of ‘social give and take’,125 with the result that ‘living relationship[s] to each other and 
to the social life of the …  world would be woven into the … structure of the mental life of young 
women’.126  
Goodsell’s suspicion of a higher education for women that is aloof from the concerns of every day 
life and her wish to break down barriers between subjects leads to a prescription for women’s edu-
cation that would introduce a domestic element into the college of liberal arts and the high school 
and would introduce liberal education into education for girls of the labouring class and into trade 
schools for women. Goodsell argues that vocational training has been seen only in terms of acquir-
ing technical skill with immediate market value, whereas she sees it as just as important for girls of 
the labouring class to ‘enlarge the scope and significance of their education’ through the ‘infusion 
of liberal education with social purpose’. For Goodsell, this requires ‘the emancipation of voca-
tional education from the dominance of cramping conceptions of its end’ with the aim of becoming 
‘truly liberalising to the mind’.127 Conversely, domestic instruction in the college of liberal arts and 
the high school is to become ‘infused with social purpose and efficiency’. Goodsell’s prescriptions 
for liberal and vocational education for women play into her desire for an education that is closer to 
the experience of day to day life and into her stress on social inter-relations in society, where she, 
like Dewey, sees the family as a basic unit. Her proposals for conjoining liberal and vocational as-
pects in women’s education hark back to a need she identifies in The Conflict of Naturalism and 
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Humanism for the ‘interaction of thought and things’.128 This stress in The Crisis of Naturalism and 
Humanism on elucidating the relation in experience of what otherwise separated out as dualisms 
threads as a philosophical element through her historical scholarship going forward and her pre-
scriptions for educational practice. 
But Goodsell was also on feminist ground, where analysis of the position of women and their role 
in the family were diverse, as Goodsell herself outlines in the final chapter of The Family as a So-
cial and Educational Institution. Here she attempts to identify dualisms by classifying theories of 
women and the family in dichotomous terms as radical or conservative before sketching out a mid-
dle ground of experience in which to locate ‘moderate progressives’. These are the ‘educated men 
and women’ who constitute ‘the majority of the enlightened and reflective minds in the commu-
nity’129 who are in favour of a ‘gradual solution for the perplexing questions involved in modern 
family life in the light of reason, good will and social experience’.130 Goodsell’s desire to introduce 
a domestic element into the college of liberal arts and the high school and to introduce liberal edu-
cation into vocational and trade school education for girls emerges as a prescription to bring to-
gether educational practice that is otherwise separated. It resonates with her desire for continuities 
in respect of dualisms and to ‘harmonize’ otherwise ‘discordant elements’ that in the philosophy of 
her doctoral thesis are grounded in a bifurcation of humanism and naturalism. But emerging from 
her thinking in The Education of Women about dualisms of liberal and vocational education is an 
image of womanhood in which the particular ‘qualities’ of the woman are shaped through both in-
tellectual and vocational activity. This continuity can be mapped, in turn, onto the double burden of 
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work and home for women and so onto the time-poor everyday lives of women, with its dilemmas 
and contradictions, that feminist scholars have worked down the years to understand, critique and 
overcome131 and which intersects with notions of class and race in diverse ways.132 
Conclusion 
Emerging from a diffractive reading is Goodsell's and Dewey’s shared approach to genetic history 
as a scientific tool for understanding the present and as a pedagogical device that fashions the ‘edu-
cated person’ through a style of reason that configures a form of historical consciousness amenable 
to the pursuit of change in both society and its citizens. Diffractive reading also illustrates a shared 
orientation around communication that Biesta argues is central to Dewey’s view of an education to 
counteract the ‘crisis in culture’ and the obfuscation of continuities across hard-to-shift dualisms.  
But diffractive reading also points up ‘exclusions that [come to] matter’.133 Dewey’s central princi-
ple of continuity between dualisms is eclipsed in respect of his treatment of gender relations. While 
Goodsell interpolates gendered power and female practices into her accounts and traces women’s 
movement across public-private boundaries, Dewey eclipses questions of male power and leaves 
the dualisms of public-private intact. What emerges as a matter that ‘comes to matter’ is that his po-
sition around relations of gender feeds into what Biesta identifies as a more general ‘apolitical’ 
stance in his work: one that orients Dewey to a view of view of education that is moral and social 
and aligned with a notion of education as Bildung. Goodsell’s political intent in redressing the posi-
tion of women leads to a prescription for women’s education geared to ‘qualities’ fashioned through 
liberal and vocational education, and linked to the importance that she (like Dewey) attributes to the 
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family as a social unit and illustrates an orientation to a view of education as Erziehung. While 
Goodsell addresses aspects of women’s education through an agenda that male progressive educa-
tors ignored, her continued adherence to a philosophical project that sought to relate dualisms to 
each other in experience underpins tensions in prescriptions for an education comprising both lib-
eral and vocational education. This adherence suggests a potential thread for future study of the 
range of tensions to which Weiler’s analysis of Goodsell’s approach to women’s education and citi-
zenship alerts. 
In returning to the two statements that prompted this article, a diffractive analysis illustrates that 
Goodsell shapes historical analysis through genetic history as outlined by Dewey and through a 
conceptual apparatus grounded in a philosophical project she and Dewey shared. This was focussed 
around the relation in experience of dualisms that she pursued from The Conflict of Humanism and 
Naturalism onwards. For Dewey history emerges as a tool of philosophy, whereas for Goodsell, 
philosophy emerges as a tool in her historical analysis. In re-orienting her focus to women and the 
family it was the balance between history and philosophy that shifted in Goodsell’s scholarship ra-
ther than a turn from philosophy after doctoral study to the study of women and the family.  
Goodsell continued to adhere to shared notions of education and of democracy with Dewey to 
which her acknowledgements of Dewey’s ‘vivification’ alerts; but she was no ‘mere student’ of 
Dewey’s philosophy. The political intent that drove her scholarship and led to an approach resonat-
ing with Erziehung is suggestive of Dewey’s comment that women’s philosophising would not be 
the same ‘in viewpoint or tenor’ as that composed from the standpoint of the ‘masculine experience 
of things’. But whether Dewey’s comment on women having yet made little contribution to philoso-
phy may have had more to do with the isolation of women from the powerful all male discussion 
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groups at Teachers College in the inter-war period that Weiler traces must remain a matter of con-
jecture.134 
Despite the tendency for male contemporaries to ignore women educationists, both Weiler and Eliz-
abeth St Pierre point to the importance of considering relationships between women writers and the 
writings of male contemporaries with whom they share both a language and political goals, but 
whose writings ‘faced towards (and plug into) concerns that differ in both focus and intensity’.135 
In seeking connections, contrasts, and interference patterns136 diffractive reading provides a strategy 
through which to work in the ‘middle’ of Goodsell’s and Dewey’s writing. It does so in ways with 
the potential to highlight both processes through which truths and knowledge are produced and the 
truths and knowledge produced. Diffractive reading illustrates some similarities and differences 
with the ‘mosaic of quotations’ constituting intertextuality to which Kristeva alerts.137 In highlight-
ing elements that both Goodsell and Dewey shared, but also how exclusions in their texts come to 
matter,138 diffraction assists in moving beyond the ‘vivification’ that signals links between Good-
sell’s and Dewey’s texts; and it moves beyond how Goodsell’s attribution of this ‘vivification’ 
might mark her ‘intentions’ to direct and control the reception of the text, as Genette’s intra-textual 
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notion of paratext might suggest.139 In pursuing the effects of ‘differences that matter’ that Barad 
contends result from ‘interferences’ between texts’140 diffraction moves beyond comparing or con-
trasting texts for the intertextual ‘blends’ and ‘clashes’ to which Roland Barthes refers,141 and it 
goes beyond the search for competing and conflicting voices and dialogic clashes to which Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony alerts.142  It is in the potential for new understandings to emerge 
from the ‘interferences’ between texts where the claims for the benefits of diffraction can be found. 
But it remains an open question whether a research strategy around diffraction constitutes an en-
hanced form of intertextual and intra-textual reading. 
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